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Beyond the Organic Intellectual: Politics and Contestation 
in the Planning Practice
ALICE STEFANELLI
Durham University
Abstract
Critical scholarship often presents technical experts such as architects and urbanists as 
unidimensional “organic intellectuals” in the Gramscian sense. Drawing from ethno-
graphic fieldwork conducted among architects-turned-campaigners in Lebanon, this 
article argues that this portrayal of experts is partial, and inadequate to represent and 
make sense of the composite coalitions that animate contemporary urban politics world-
wide. This will be clarified by a close examination of the Hakmeh Axis Campaign, 
where architects and urbanists have initiated a vigorous civic campaign to oppose the 
construction of a motorway bridge through a historical neighborhood in Beirut. By 
exploring the politics of planners—rather than that of planning—the article will show 
the alignment between expertise and authorities to be a matter of political affiliation 
rather than natural necessity. [Expertise; Civic Campaigning; Urban Space; Politics; 
Lebanon]
In the spring of 2014, a prominent Lebanese architect took to the pages of the country’s English-language newspaper to voice his opinions on the latest infrastructural plan announced by the municipality of Beirut 
(al baladia) a year earlier and expected. The Hakmeh Axis project was 
a decades-old plan for a bridge first conceived of in the 1950s and, after 
a forty-year hiatus, resurrected in hopes of easing some of city’s famous 
traffic (‘aj’a) problems. Justified as the ideal infrastructural solution 
to the chronic congestion of the city’s eastern area, the bridge would 
connect the upper side of the Achrafieh hill to the Sea Road (Charles 
Helou Avenue), cutting across the neighborhoods of Achrafieh and 
Mar Mikhael. The road would pass right next to the well-known high 
school Collège de la Sagesse (Al Hakmeh), and its construction would sub-
stantially restructure the fabric of the area. Works would in fact cause 
the destruction of numerous residential buildings, many of which had 
historical character, as well as rare pockets of green—the last tokens of 
Achrafieh’s agricultural past. Many long-term residents would lose their 
homes and be forced to relocate.
The architect’s assessment was altogether not too positive.
Unfortunately, the problems with the Fouad Boutros Axis project 
persist
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However, the responses heard in the past week reveal a much more 
serious set of problems that have led to this confrontation. They reveal 
an outdated understanding of the contemporary city and administra-
tive thinking that is out of touch with solutions being used worldwide 
and with the ambitions of Beirut’s citizens and their right to the city.
 Hashim Sarkis, the Daily Star, 4 April 2014
Sarkis was not the only expert in Beirut to openly dislike the project. 
When in 2012 some academics and practitioners in the field of architec-
ture first heard that the Hakmeh Axis project might go ahead, a number of 
them began mobilizing against it. Among these were Joseph and Atallah, 
two architects in their twenties and forties respectively. When I met the 
two in 2015, the group had been campaigning for the better part of three 
years. Atallah and Joseph’s stories epitomized those of many of their col-
leagues and fellow campaigners. Apart from having helped kickstart the 
Fouad Boutros campaign, Joseph was engaged in other civic causes re-
lated to the built environment, such as the protection of historical build-
ings, including collaborating with a local heritage non-governmental 
organization (NGO). Atallah had not done any active campaigning in 
years, but he was far from being a novice in the field. After the Lebanese 
Civil War (1975–1990), when he was fresh out of university, he had mo-
bilized together with many other professionals, academics, and ordinary 
citizens against the reconstruction of the city’s Downtown. Led by a pri-
vate-public company effectively controlled by the then-prime minister, 
the project was strongly criticized at the time because it would replace 
the socially mixed historical city center with an island of wealth and 
privilege made of new luxury developments with no soul (Makdisi 1997; 
Naccache 1998). Demoralized by the ensuing defeat, Atallah, like many 
others, abandoned open mobilization; however, alongside his career, he 
continued to work to protect the built heritage, teaming up with like-
minded colleagues and the Ministry of Culture. Thanks to their efforts, 
many heritage buildings were listed and preserved. Yet for the past three 
years, he had returned to active campaigning, appalled by a project that, 
from his point of view, had no technical justification whatsoever and was 
likely to serve only the interests of those behind it. After years of quiet 
work behind the scenes, Atallah was thus drawn back in by yet another 
project that smacked of particularistic interests, but which was presented 
as the ultimate urbanistic marvel. In response, Atallah, Joseph, and their 
fellow campaigners advocated for a better management of the exist-
ing infrastructure, and for the building of a neighborhood park in Mar 
Mikhael instead of a highway. The municipality’s understanding of urban 
management clearly had little in common with Atallah and Joseph’s.
Anthropology’s concern for urban change has grown in the past two 
decades, with a specific emphasis on the multiple forces that structure 
and restructure the physical and social environments of cities in the 
neoliberal era. Ethnographically, researchers have focused on document-
ing the ways in which inhabitants are affected by these disruptions and 
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relocations, and the ways in which they navigate the new socio-spatial 
arrangements (Ismail 2006; Elyachar 2005; Horst 2008; Holston 1989; 
Kanna 2011; Herzfeld 2009). State-led urban planning has thus featured 
prominently in this literature as one of the forces shaping cities, respon-
sible for the top-down disruption and reconstitution of urban life. In 
this, anthropologists have been largely inspired and influenced by criti-
cal scholarship on space, such as Lefebvre (1991), Castells (1977), and 
De Certeau (1984), whose work has exposed the strong alignment 
between state planning and elites’ interests, and planning’s strong ten-
dency to benefit the middle and upper classes at the disadvantage of mar-
ginalized city dwellers—planning’s “noir side.”
Yet, anthropologists have arguably shown remarkably little ethno-
graphic interest for architects and engineers themselves.1 This might be 
explained in part as a professional inclination, since anthropologists are 
committed to learning from the marginalized and the voiceless, and thus 
tend to foster an interest in forms of local knowledge and expertise that 
are not institutionalized or officially recognized (Harvey & Knox 2015). 
Moreover, researchers might face issues of access to planning agencies 
and architectural studios (Barthel 2010; Baxstrom 2013).
Beyond this, and more importantly here, anthropologists have 
regarded architects and engineers as an integral part of the planning 
machine that, as Abram and Weszkalnys (2013) have remarked, they 
have tended to demonize. Experts do appear occasionally as interlocutors 
in ethnographic studies, but they are primarily examined for their func-
tion within the planning process, as the minds and hands drafting the 
plans that authorities will then implement. In these analyses, the state, 
bureaucracies and their effects are often the actual object of study. By 
extension, experts are seen as tacitly advancing the interests of their pow-
erful patrons through their work, agreeing to disguise self-interested proj-
ects as technical solutions dictated by scientific necessity that it is claimed 
rests at the heart of planning. The technical expert assumes the role of 
“the villain in the critical social sciences” (Harvey & Knox 2015, 9), 
the prototype of the “organic intellectual” (Gramsci 2006).2
Notable exceptions to this general trend do exist. Two such instances 
are Harvey and Knox (2015) and Evans (2016)’s ethnographies, ana-
lyzing the construction of a motorway in Peru and the planning of the 
legacy of the London Olympic Park respectively. All such works confirm 
and elaborate on the inextricable entanglement of politics and planning 
but also present richer pictures of experts—as well as some bureaucrats—
as complex, tri-dimensional characters.3 These ethnographic engage-
ments also remind us that accounts emphasizing engineers’ ordering 
capacity “capture a key dimension of the modern engineer’s self-image, 
but as descriptions of engineering practice they run up against the limits 
of their own presuppositions and pay scant attention to the anxieties and 
internal critiques that have always been integral to modernist thinking” 
(Harvey & Knox 2015, 8, emphasis added).
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Such critiques are exemplified by Davidoff’s (1965) “advocacy plan-
ning,” the spirit of which has inspired experts to stand with commu-
nities and against authorities (Checkoway 1994). The construction of 
the Narmada River Valley dam (Turaga 2000; Routledge 2003) and the 
redevelopment of Berkley’s People’s Park (Allen 2011; Mitchell 2016) 
are two such cases. More recently, “radical planning” has also encour-
aged experts to develop a critical attitude toward neoliberal participa-
tory practices that promise inclusion but often fall short of that target 
(Miraftab 2009; Tooley 2017). Against this background, Harvey and 
Knox’s (2015) approach is helpful and particularly important because 
it acknowledges these kinds of self-critiques and takes them seriously, 
while simultaneously examining the nuances of the engineering practice 
ethnographically, thus complicating the relationship between discursive 
rhetoric, politics, technical expertise, and the concrete realization of 
engineering projects.
This article builds on such work, with the aim of problematizing 
assumptions about the relationship between technical experts, their 
expertise, and power. Particularly, the following pages will question the 
“organic” relationship between experts and political power that seems 
implied by much of the work on planning in the critical social sciences. 
After a more in-depth exploration of the notion of “organic intellectual,” 
the argument will be articulated by drawing from two main sources: in 
the first section, the rich critical architectural literature that exists on the 
historical development of Lebanese urban planning; and in the second, 
ethnographic data collected among experts-turned-civic campaigners. 
Focusing on an instance where technical skills are directed against cen-
tral planning, the third section suggests that the subservience of profes-
sional expertise to the state and its ruling elites is not a matter of natural 
necessity but rather one of political affiliation, and that expertise can be 
a weapon to attempt to curtail the interests of the ruling elites as much 
as it can be a vehicle for their enhancement. This acknowledgment will 
in turn offer some room to reconsider architects’ social commitments and 
role in the public sphere.
The final point put forth by the article is in fact that focusing our 
attention on the changing positioning of experts within urban politics 
offers a vantage point from which it is possible to better explore the 
reconfigurations of power geographies that are taking place in cities 
today. Especially at a time when urban life under neoliberal modes of 
governance is constantly “creatively destroyed” and restructured (Harvey 
2007; Peck & Tickell 2002), I suggest that an ethnographic outlook on 
professionals of the built environment might help critical scholarship 
to acknowledge and examine the full diversity of actors, coalitions, and 
forms of opposition to top-down urban governance that are emerging on 
the ground. Assessing the strengths, fragilities, strategies, and potential-
ities of these coalitions, I argue, might be key to sharpening our analyses 
of contemporary urban politics.
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High-modernism, Gramsci, and Urban Planning in 
Anthropology
The management of urban spaces has held a central role in the development of the planning practice, and cities in colonized and non-colonized worlds have served as open-air laboratories for social 
engineering, designed by experts and endorsed by authorities (Rabinow 
1989; Scott 1998; Abram & Weszkalnys 2013). Modern urbanistic 
efforts have sought to impose a coherent rationality and a homogeneous, 
geometrical, and formal order, to enforce a “concept city” (De Certeau 
1984, 95) and an abstract plan over the otherwise spontaneous chaos 
of the urban (Lefebvre 1970; Merrifield 1993) in order to regulate it, 
shape it, and renew it according to ostensibly scientific principles. From 
Baron Haussmann’s retrofitting of Paris (Harvey 2013) to the openly 
modernist construction of Brasilia (Holston 1989) and Portmore (Horst 
2008), urbanism has served as a political tool to attempt to create a new, 
perfected social urban order, one that was supposed to improve citizens’ 
lives while simultaneously making populations and space more eas-
ily controllable. Experts have often espoused this technocratic project 
eagerly, as it combined well with their own “pious aspirations” (Rodwin 
1981, 231) about the utopian promise of planning. If only the anti-sci-
entific demands of politics could be kept at a distance, planners would 
have been able to finally make good use of their near-infallible technical 
expertise. Political constraints and meddling, and failures and their con-
sequences on local populations were, of course, routinely hidden from 
sight, downplayed, and concealed via denials (Ferguson 1990; Mitchell 
2002).
As the material creators and executors of plans, experts appear as 
organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense: fully involved in the statist 
practice of planning, they act as “the dominant’s group ‘deputies’, exercis-
ing the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political governance” 
(2006 [1994], 88). This black-and-white perspective on planning experts 
locates them squarely within the state’s planning machine: designers and 
executors of the sociopolitical elites’ projects, submitted yet aligned with 
the power designs of rulers. Few anthropological works have presented a 
more nuanced picture. Among these, one interesting instance is Ahmed 
Kanna’s (2011) work on the development of Dubai, and particularly his 
detailed discussion of “starchitects” work in the United Arab Emirates. 
There, Kanna argues that, even when they embrace some of the insights 
offered by radical planning, “starchitects” working for local elites risk 
reinforcing the latter’s political hegemony. This, architects do by uncrit-
ically incorporating official narratives about the history and character 
of the nation in their projects, thus reproducing and legitimizing these 
narratives and their creators; however, this is presented by Kanna as a 
pitfall of the architects’ clumsy attempt to include the local “culture” 
in their work rather than a conscious decision to side with authorities. 
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The argument can be pushed further still to suggest that the relationship 
between power and experts may in fact take different shapes. A close 
examination of urban planning in Beirut provides us with an opportunity 
to explore one such alternative articulation and the implications that 
this analysis might carry for anthropological theory more generally. A 
focused review of the vast literature on the historical development of this 
relationship since the post-WWII era offers some initial material.
Governments in early Independent Lebanon displayed little interest 
for urban planning. In the decades following Independence from France 
in 1943, Beirut grew dramatically in size and population, making the 
management of the sprawling built environment a rather pressing issue 
(Bourgey & Pharès 1973; Kassir 2010). However, successive plans were 
commissioned and immediately shelved (plan Ecochard 1943; Egli plan-
ning report 1950; Ecochard-Egli masterplan 1954). Some of the measures 
taken by such plans clashed with powerful interests, particularly those of 
the powerful and politically well-connected construction industry. The 
fortunes of planners began to change in the late 1950s, with President 
Fouad Shihab’s reformism (1958–1964), based on the centrality of the 
state, giving planning a new central position within public action. If 
issues of urban management were still seen by the administration as 
being of secondary importance (Verdeil 2014), the concerted pressure of 
architects and engineers—collectively called muhandesun in Arabic4 and 
established as an official Order in the early 1950s—gained some victo-
ries. Administrative bodies in charge of overseeing urban planning, such 
as the Planning Ministry, the General Directorate of Urban Planning 
(DGU), and the Higher Council for Urban Planning, were all estab-
lished at this time (Ghandour 2003). Moreover, the 1954 Ecochard mas-
terplan was finally adopted in 1964, albeit heavily amended. The most 
significant alterations related to the realm of zoning, since the final plan 
allowed higher floor-area ratios (FARs) than what was originally set.5 
In practical terms, this meant that a higher density of construction was 
allowed in the different sectors of the city, itself a gift to landowners and 
real estate developers (Verdeil 2014).
If the adoption of the masterplan depended on architects’ lobbying, 
changes to FARs within it were evidence of the continued and successful 
pressure exerted by the construction industry on policy-makers. This ver-
sion of the masterplan was openly disliked by many local planners. At the 
same time, given the circumstances, compromising on some aspect of the 
project was deemed unavoidable by most, if any plan was to be approved 
at all (Verdeil 2012). In the end, the masterplan was only applied dis-
continuously. In the absence of state proactivity, it was largely private 
initiative that confronted Beirut’s rapid urbanization and gave the city its 
shape. Atallah summarized this history best when he told me that:
The problem is that there is no masterplan for the city that tells you 
what the city needs, and there is no vision of what city do we want one 
generation from now. It’s all ad hoc, most big decisions are taken by 
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developers, through cumulative actions they decide on density. I mean, 
they don’t even decide: the result of their work is the decision on 
density.
 (Interview with Atallah, August 2015)
The laissez-faire approach adopted by the Lebanese state, and the free 
reign that this left to the construction industry, meant that the latter was 
the true urbanistic force in Independent Beirut.
The traditional Lebanese “loose approach” to planning (Kassir 2010, 
417) has certainly not waned in the contemporary period. First, the legal 
framework regulating the built environment has been gradually modified 
to favor the interests of private developers, who are often directly involved 
in the drafting of new legislation (for instance, the 2004 Building law in 
Krijnen & Fawaz 2010; see also Geisser & Pieri, 2014). Secondly, the 
practice of public agencies overseeing the granting of planning permis-
sions has been increasingly informalized, meaning that the application of 
regulation is often suspended, so that decision-making based on ad hoc 
exceptions to the law has become a de facto planning practice (Fawaz 
2016). As eloquently stated by architect Hicham El-Achkar (2012, 6), 
in the field of the management of the built environment:
[. . .] the dominant political elite exercises two kinds of interventions 
on the public authorities: a formal one, via regulation, exemption and 
extension of implementation; and an informal one, by politicizing the 
administration and exerting pressure. [. . .]the inactive actions’ aim is to 
preserve the status quo, while the active actions serve the enlargement 
of real-estate development. From another side, the dominant elite invest 
heavily in real estate, through their companies, or as silent associates.
Urban planning thus was and indeed still is marred by political and 
economic interests, something that is common knowledge among experts 
and that, as we have seen, has often attracted their staunch disapproval, 
too. As became clear during fieldwork, if the hold of developers on public 
decision-making has not abated in the post-war period, the disagreement 
from sectors of the country’s experts has not faded, either.
Expertise in Action: The Fouad Boutros Coalition
The Fouad Boutros campaign, the full name of which is the more lengthy “Civil Coalition against the Highway project ‘Hakmeh-Turk axis’ (Fouad Boutros Road)” (al intilaf al madani al rafad ‘ala 
tariq muhdur “al Hakmeh- al Turk” [shar‘a Fuad Boutros]) represented the 
continued professional disapproval and deep frustration felt by some 
muhandesun in Beirut. While in time the campaign had gained the active 
support of many local residents, its first impulse had come from a mixed 
network of professionals and academics.6 Much in the same way as the 
reconstruction of the Downtown twenty years earlier, the Fouad Boutros 
project was seen by campaigners as an example of public works subjugated 
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to economic and political interests, but presented as a project devised to 
better citizens’ lives and justified by the logics of technical expertise. My 
interlocutors deemed it a perfect example of the infallible hegemony of 
private interests and political motives in contemporary Beirut—and they 
did not shy away from expressing their views on the matter, in private 
and in public.
At some point in the autumn of 2012, a number of academics heard 
that the municipality was preparing to implement the project. Quickly, 
some of them took initiative and contacted other colleagues; an initially 
small group grew quickly. All sorts of experts joined: they were environ-
mentalists, architects and engineers, academics, and practitioners, liv-
ing both in Lebanon and abroad. Many of them had mobilized against 
Solidere, not only by joining protests but also by publishing newspaper 
articles and editing academic books on the topic. Some also supported 
other causes surrounding public space management in the city, and I 
heard their names or pieces being mentioned across different campaigns. 
The rate at which the campaign grew shows how much frustration 
experts in Beirut felt at the way authorities—who they have to deal with 
regularly—manage the urban environment. Soon the group began lobby-
ing the municipality to stop the project—as Joseph put it, to “talk some 
sense into them.” The campaign’s main argument was that the project 
followed an outdated, flawed, 1950s rational that urban planning had 
long abandoned in favor of more efficient approaches. Throughout the 
winter, professionals tried to convince municipal planning “experts” to 
abandon the project. Perhaps unsurprisingly, my interlocutors always 
stressed the inverted commas in “experts” in this context, to clarify their 
lack of belief in these people’s professional credentials, since in their 
view municipal plans displayed no trace of actual professional expertise.
With this initial pressure unsuccessful, campaigners began talking 
about the project publicly, contacting the press and TV channels to 
spread the news. Between 2012 and 2015, three different waves of pub-
lic outrage hit the municipality via the media: as the news spread and 
the scandal grew, all kinds of broadcasters, regardless of their political 
affiliation, turned sympathetic to their cause. This was documented 
by the Coalition’s large and growing news items archive, which they 
patiently gathered and then put online for people to browse. A large 
proportion of these consisted of statements by experts, as well as detailed 
technical analyses and counterplans. All the while, campaigners con-
tinued to directly lobby the municipality whom, under the sudden pub-
lic pressure, felt forced to invite a select group of experts—including 
some belonging to the campaign—to a meeting in the spring of 2013, 
to try to convince the skeptical amongst them of the worthiness of the 
project.
The meeting at the baladia was a catastrophe for the municipality. 
Previously, the nascent coalition had put together a sixty-page technical 
dossier detailing the many technical issues found in the project, complete 
with pictures, however, their municipal hosts seemed somehow unable to 
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match the documentation they had produced. As I was told, a represen-
tative of the planning unit went on a whiteboard and drew a sketch of 
the grid of the city’s highway, then commented, with reference to the 
trajectory of the proposed bridge: “Look, there’s a missing link, we have 
to complete the grid, that is why it’s [the highway network] not work-
ing!” As Joseph explained to me, while a similar explanation might seem 
logical and justified, the reality was that the promise of speed brought by 
a new highway would simply attract more cars, and this would counter-
balance the initial advantage in a short couple of years. The “solution” 
would soon create more of the same problem. In addition, the audience 
was shown a tri-dimensional simulation of the bridge, with mirrors along 
its sides, and told that the construction would fit in with the “hipster” 
character of the Mar Mikhael neighborhood, where that section of the 
bridge would pass. Justifications that might have worked with the gen-
eral public surely did not go down well with the professionals in atten-
dance. Unsurprisingly, the audience tore the project apart with a cascade 
of objections.
After this first debacle and a new wave of media pressure, the munic-
ipality was forced to announce that they were choosing to conform to the 
Minister of the Environment’s guidelines and would undertake an envi-
ronmental assessment. This, according to campaigners, was the cam-
paign’s first victory. In the spring and summer of 2014, experts met twice 
with the private company in charge of the project. Each time, the latter 
were said to have left the meetings “overwhelmed”: professionals in fact 
came with their own reports, highlighting all the technical flaws of the 
company’s plan, as well as the limited empirical evidence underscoring 
the scoping project presented. Eventually, the company fell silent, and as 
of spring 2015 no one had heard from them in months.
Exposing the fictitious legitimacy of the highway project was the 
strategy that campaigners employed in public gatherings involving 
non-expert audiences, too. Technical arguments were difficult to put 
across effectively to a non-professional audience, but this remained the 
Coalition’s way forward. When I was conducting fieldwork in 2015, 
the media’s attention had faded and the project appeared to have been 
halted. Campaigners, however, continued their awareness activities, 
delivering the odd public talk. It was at one such event that I witnessed 
Atallah and Joseph in action, as the two architects addressed the alumni 
of an English-speaking university. Atallah was physically present at the 
event, while Joseph, away for work, would Skype in to give his part of 
the presentation. The talk was held in a quiet corner of the university 
campus, and was part of an ongoing series of monthly cultural activities 
organised by the Alumni Association.
The event took place in a small room on the ground floor. All but 
one light had been lowered in order to enable guests to see the images 
on the screen, enveloping the room in a soft penumbra. Unsurprisingly, 
since this was an Alumni Association, presenters would talk to a fairly 
mature public, with most of the twenty-odd attendees seemingly in their 
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fifties or older. Although nobody wore formal attire like suits or tailleurs, 
all looked quite distinguished. Atallah sat at the desk, initially speaking 
to the audience from behind the screen of his laptop, as he struggled 
with Lebanon’s notoriously temperamental Internet connection. Once 
a Skype link was secured, Atallah pushed the laptop aside, and he and 
Joseph finally introduced themselves to their audience. Atallah was the 
first to speak. He announced that they would try to keep the talk to 
an hour but, he cautioned, “We’re architects, we digress sometimes!” a 
remark that drew a number of amused chuckles from the audience. His 
opening was suggestive:
Places follow ideas that evolve over time. Cars, highways, tunnels: this 
is [in the collective imagination] the stuff of cities. But it’s changing 
quickly. Today re-designing is being abandoned in favor of managing. 
With denser cities and thus more people, we need more public spaces, 
for pedestrians. Our inspirations are Jane Jacobs and Kevin Lynch, in 
the 1970s in the US. Lynch’s seminal work is “What time is this place?” 
from which we get inspiration for our presentation’s title: “What time 
is this highway?”
Over the course of an hour, Atallah and Joseph took turns describing 
the different aspects of the Hakmeh Axis project, aided by a PowerPoint 
presentation. Slides included detailed plans of Beirut, and particularly of 
the hill of Achrafieh; it was through those that the speakers explained 
to their audience traffic patterns, congestion points, building laws, and 
different possible solutions to traffic problems in the area. Diagrams were 
detailed yet clear; Joseph had told me more than once that they took 
great care to simplify professional material enough for non-experts to 
understand it. Their aim was to enable the average citizen to easily access 
otherwise complicated technical information.
Two interlinked propositions rested at the heart of the presentation: 
that the Hakmeh Axis project had no scientific basis, and that the rea-
son behind its resurrection had nothing to do with technical expertise 
and all to do with political-economic rationales. Firstly, the project was 
described as outdated: the city had changed, the architects said, and 
an old solution such as this highway bridge would be unable to cope 
with the monstrous traffic flows of contemporary Beirut. The idea rested 
on obsolete models that were popular in the 1950s, but modern urban 
planning had abandoned them for quite some time. By resurrecting the 
project, campaigners said, the municipality simply refused to accept this 
truth. The lack of alternative proposals to solve the congestion issue 
was described by speakers as further evidence of the municipality’s utter 
lack of professionalism. Considering only one possible solution was com-
pletely extraneous to correct norms of good urban planning, the two 
architects said. Accepted good practice in the profession demanded that 
first of all, a number of plans must be drafted. Each of these would be 
assessed by means of an individual, independent impact study before any 
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final decision could be taken. “Usually, there is an option a, and then an 
option b, c, d,” Joseph clarified. “Here we only have someone one day 
saying, ‘We’re doing a highway.’”
Disregarding all technical common sense, officials played on the 
Lebanese collective imagery, where roads remained a symbol of state 
presence, in the hope that this would give their project some appeal. 
Atallah and Joseph suggested that since the project so completely lacked 
technical legitimacy and value, the motivation for the realization of the 
project may lay elsewhere. More realistically, they argued, the building of 
the bridge was driven by the new potential that the project would offer 
for real estate development in an already densely built area. As Atallah 
later eloquently explained to me:
The bottom line is that the highway creates access and visibility to 
an otherwise dormant area and it opens up the potential to real es-
tate development in ways that have not been seen in Beirut. I mean, 
the release of accessible and developable land is significant by Beirut 
standard
 (Interview with Atallah, August 2015)
This meant that in terms of business, contractors of all stripes and colors 
would benefit from the works. A similar commentary on the project was 
given to me by architect friends who were not directly involved in cam-
paigning but shared Atallah and Joseph’s keen interest in urban affairs. 
It was commonly understood that the mayor, who belonged to the Sunni 
Future Movement, had been playing with local sectarian politics in this 
instance. He in fact tried to present the highway, which was expected to 
pass in the vicinity of the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese (al Batriarkia), 
as a “gift” to Christian-majority Achrafieh. After all, the bridge’s new 
name honored Fouad Boutros, a prominent Greek-Orthodox politician. 
Reportedly, the mayor had lamented during a semi-public talk at a local 
university that opposition to the project was itself sectarian in nature, 
since it was a political strategy to prevent the municipal council from 
helping the Christian area. “They won’t let us!” he had apparently de-
clared to his audience. Experts seemingly had little faith in politicians’ 
willingness to prioritize good urban management and residents’ rights 
over profit-making.
The presentation ended with a small exploration of how the 
Coalition imagined the future of Achrafieh, as they did not limit them-
selves to simply criticizing the Hakmeh Axis project. In a bid to show 
that other options existed for the management of the city, the campaign 
had proposed the establishment of a public park on the portion of land 
that the municipality had already expropriated before the onset of the 
civil war. As an architectural artefact, the plan had been designed and 
looked exactly like any other professional project: the area that the park 
would cover was superimposed in green on the map of the neighborhood, 
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complete with red squares to mark all the expropriated buildings that 
would be preserved, and dotted lines to indicate the new pedestrian foot-
paths that were suggested. As if they were presenting their proposal to 
a client, campaigners had also produced a number of visuals to promote 
the alternative project—from aerial pictures to street-level simulations. 
At the alumni association, Joseph and Atallah projected these images at 
the end of their presentation, in order to allow their audience to visualize 
their vision of a different Achrafieh. Many in the room nodded in agree-
ment when the images appeared on the screen: in a city as congested 
and lacking in green as Beirut, the vision of a garden must have been, to 
some, as enchanting as a highway.
The Politics of Planners
Anthropologists might not have readily acknowledged this, but planning experts have long begun to question the nature of the relationship between power and their practice: committed and 
ideological high-modernists are no longer a hegemonic voice in the field. 
When Rodwin pointed out that the most fervent technocrats might pray 
that “someday planning and management might be liberated from the 
thralldom of politics” (1981, 239), he implicitly recognized that planners 
are well aware of the entanglements between power and their practice. 
Plans are ultimately always a compromise between what experts would 
ideally want to do and what they are allowed to do, for reasons that are 
material and financial—what is possible to do with the given environ-
ment and available resources—but that are also dependent on what is 
politically allowed.
Beirut’s urban planning policies are an illustrative example of this, 
since political logics routinely overrule experts’ preferences. This history 
is, however, also an illustration of the fact that planners are not only 
aware of this reality but that they do not necessarily hide it—quite the 
contrary. If in fact some professionals—those employed by the munic-
ipality, for instance—seem prepared to rubber stamp whatever plans 
politicians might desire, some are not. For the latter, Beirut’s urbanistic 
history is in fact a history of endless frustration that has often produced 
more criticism than praise in professional circles.
If in Beirut this historical trend seems to endure, so does the discon-
tent of many muhandesun. Not only did campaigners target politicians 
whom they saw as invoking technical merit as a mere façade; they also 
criticized municipal planners for their ineptitude, and their unwilling-
ness to accept the advances of scientific knowledge and defend an inde-
fensible project at the expense of inhabitants’ health and their right to 
their homes and neighborhoods. It was not clear whether technical staff 
was thought of as being merely incompetent, actively politically aligned, 
unwillingly coerced, or a mix of all three. What was clear was that their 
performance and the products of their efforts simply did not live up to 
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the standards that campaigners deemed professional. It was the lack of 
professional merit that opened the way to accusations of other inter-
ests lying right below the surface. These observations, I believe, serve 
as ample evidence that planners and architects are not necessarily mere 
technocrats willing to pass off political interest as technical worth, possi-
bly in order to see their own grand plans implemented.
Such professional discontent has oftentimes translated itself into 
concrete mobilization. The recent history of protests against urban proj-
ects in Beirut is punctuated by civic campaigns orchestrated by profes-
sionals. Together with environmentalists, muhandesun were the most 
populous professional group amongst them. At the time I was conducting 
fieldwork, at least half a dozen different campaigns led or eagerly sup-
ported by architects and engineers were active in the contestation of 
different projects. These included the privatization and redevelopment 
of two sections of the littoral, Ramlet al-Bayda, and Daliet ar-Raouche, 
and the construction of a football stadium inside the only large city park, 
Hursh al Snawbar. These activities were also preceded by a long history 
of similar campaigns following the end of hostilities in 1990: not only the 
fight for Downtown and the built heritage across town but also mobiliza-
tions for the safeguard of public beaches from privatization and the pres-
ervation and management of the urban green, such as the René Moawad 
Garden in Sanaya. One campaigner, who had been active since the end 
of the civil war, once showed me photos of a crowded conference held at 
the Order of Engineers in the early 2000s, where attendees heatedly 
debated new legal provisions that would regulate building on the coast 
from then on. Experts were not always necessarily the first or only actors 
to mobilize. Generally, muhandesun seemed well informed about any 
upcoming infrastructural or real estate development because of their 
involvement in professional circles: they heard about projects in the 
making before they were made public, at times before residents them-
selves were informed. In these cases, residents would often join later. In 
other occasions, the opposite occurred.
Although overall only a numeric minority of professionals actively 
mobilized, it was clear that there was much interest in discussing proj-
ects around urban planning and management among their colleagues. A 
number of architects I knew in Beirut were not directly involved but sup-
ported these mobilizations, kept themselves updated, and often discussed 
the latest developments. The number of events organized in Beirut based 
on these themes, together with the high degree of expert participation, 
is a testament to the lively debate that exists within professional cir-
cles. These events varied in size and nature. The various departments 
of architecture, engineering, and urban planning of universities in the 
city often organized conferences and talks on such matters. Panels of 
experts—academics, policy-makers, practitioners—were invited to elab-
orate on pressing issues such as public transport, the liberalization of 
rents, or water pollution along the coast. Often, campaigners only partic-
ipated to these events as members of the audience: they asked questions, 
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agreed or disagreed with speakers, and problematized approaches. In 
other instances, they were invited as panelists or individual speakers by 
associations as diverse as the Order of Engineers and the alumni associ-
ation mentioned above. At times, campaigners organized such events 
directly with these associations. Even when these meetings were not 
organized with professional audiences in mind, interested professionals 
would attend eagerly.
The professional dimension of the debates over urban management is 
crucial in understanding architects and engineers’ relationship to politics 
and technical expertise. Faced with projects like the Fouad Boutros high-
way bridge, campaigners felt that it was their professional and civic duty 
to raise objections, and they fought their campaigns with what weapon 
they had: their expertise. Through this, they could tear the curtain of the 
apparent technical merit of the project, to expose publicly the political 
and economic interests that lurked behind. Similar to Atallah’s opening 
remark during his talk—“we are architects”—a great emphasis was usu-
ally placed on one’s professional identity, on their skills and expertise, 
which opposed the lack of legitimacy of municipal’s “experts” and what 
plans they presented.
Categories like “citizens” or the “public” are of course heterogeneous 
and encompass multiple socioeconomic groups, and one project rarely 
benefits or damages all of them at once. In this particular case, however, 
the project would negatively affect a rather diverse collective of urban 
dwellers. First, the area affected by the project embraces a socially diverse 
space. While some of the traditionally more modest neighborhoods are 
being increasingly gentrified, a portion of their less-wealthy inhabitants 
have remained, also thanks to the so-called “Old Rent” law, which has 
maintained affordable rent and preserved a degree of social diversity in 
central Beirut. Buildings set to be demolished range from ancient heri-
tage homes from the Ottoman period and well-kept middle-class blocks 
of flats to much more modest dwellings, some of which are vestiges of 
Achrafieh’s rural past. Joseph was horrified at the way the mayor had 
reportedly slammed some of these buildings for being “ugly,” and hence 
not worth keeping. Stopping the project would preserve inhabitants’ 
homes and quality of life. Secondly, easing the congestion that envelops 
Beirut would translate into a significant improvement to the everyday 
life of the many commuting daily to the capital or moving within it. 
Easier road mobility would improve the quality of life of all such travel-
ers, from passengers of overcrowded public transport to more privileged 
individual drivers.
Interestingly, professionals-turned-campaigners openly described 
their actions as political—not in the sense that they were aligned to polit-
ical parties, one of the common understandings of the word in Lebanon, 
but in that their mobilization sought to impact the way the city was man-
aged and public authorities acted. They did, of course, hold on to their 
belief in technical expertise, but this seemed rooted in a practical, rather 
than purely theoretical, approach to planning. Particularly, campaigners 
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constantly underlined the necessity in testing the feasibility of a number 
of different plans before any one of them could be endorsed—traffic stud-
ies must be done, the environmental consequences assessed. And such 
studies must be up to a certain professional standard; the Hakmeh Axis 
contractor’s own study for instance, as we have seen, was deemed to be 
based on insufficient empirical data and thus did not count.
Thus, planners’ expertise was employed politically in the sense that 
it could be used to meet and advance the needs, interests and rights of 
urban dwellers, in a sociopolitical context where neglect of these was 
usually masked by invocations of technical necessity. Professionalism 
and expertise were thus mobilized by both parties, campaigners as well as 
the municipality, but were in fact mobilized in opposite directions, with 
opposite aims and interests at heart. Of course, experts would argue that 
municipal plans had nothing to do with expertise, hence they must be 
motivated by political and economic rationales. On the other hand, as 
the mayor’s alleged comment suggests, the municipality’s counteroffen-
sive seemed to rely on accusing opponents of acting for political reasons 
themselves. What should be noted here is that expertise is not a stable 
notion, but rather a category that shifts and is reshaped through time and 
additional practice. Therefore, if planning expertise is to be seen as sci-
entific, this scientific character must be regarded in terms of a trajectory 
of constant revision and improvement of previously accepted standards 
of practice, which also adapts to external conditions. For instance, cam-
paigners maintained that urban designs thought of in the 1950s belonged 
to that era, when cities were much smaller, as was the number of cars on 
the roads. Since Beirut and its traffic conditions had changed so dra-
matically, 1950s solutions simply no longer applied. Expertise might 
thus become outdated not necessarily because of some inherent flaw but 
because of changed circumstances, and it should be seen not as a form 
of ultimate, unchanging knowledge but rather as dynamic, evolving, and 
constantly updating. Since expertise can be discarded or updated, as well 
as used in opposing political planning rather than endorsing it, critiques 
should perhaps not focus on expertise per se.
What is political in central planning is not expertise itself but its 
employment; it is perhaps on this fact that analysis should concentrate. 
Technical expertise itself is used by authorities via the political claim 
that certain projects are justified by technical necessity, while in fact 
expertise is simply used through that claim to justify political projects and 
mask other interests that may be behind them. Plans themselves fail or 
work, promote the good of citizens or hinder it, not only or simply 
because they serve a political end but because they technically fall short 
of their objective: the feasibility study was flawed, the architect was 
incompetent, the premises outdated, materials were of poor quality, and 
some of the concrete characters of the environment were overlooked or 
simply made the project impossible to realize. Often, as anthropologists 
have clearly demonstrated, planning is lacking in some of these respects 
because of the arrogance of experts, their overlooking of essential local 
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knowledge, and their overconfidence in a delocalized, abstract technical 
expertise (Mitchell 2002).
Yet, even if technically flawed, plans that are designed with the good 
of the citizenry at heart—maybe even in collaboration with them—are 
equally destined to fail and have negative consequences on the popula-
tion; it is not simply the fact that a project is politically motivated that 
causes it to succeed or fall into ruin. Rather, plans that are sure to fail—
due to any of the above reasons and beyond—may be adopted regard-
less because of political interest. In addition, it should be highlighted 
that well-designed and collaborative plans that have a positive impact 
on citizens might also be approved and supported by an administration 
with political gain in mind. Value-laden dichotomies do not work well 
in these circumstances: the multilayered relationship between politics, 
planning, and “public interest” should not be oversimplified.
Conclusion
There was a diffused sense amongst Lebanese campaigners that poli-tics was ubiquitous in their practice and that planning had nothing neutral about it: plans—or their absence—were always entwined 
with the interests of the elites. The history of Beirut’s growth, which 
experts could explain to me as well as any academic article, was a glaring 
example of the inseparability of urbanism from politics. Many campaign-
ers, like Atallah, had lived part of that history themselves.7 The notion 
of technical expertise was routinely manipulated: its invocation served 
to disguise such interests rather than actually improving the lives of the 
Beirutis. In the specific case of the Hakmeh Axis, politicians added to 
this claim a coating of infrastructural promise, hoping that the project 
of a road would work its “enchanting” magic on the Beirutis (Harvey & 
Knox 2012).
Yet, I argue here that the frequent talks and debates over proposed 
public works that routinely take place among professionals of the built 
environment in Beirut index the eagerness of many of these experts 
to discuss and question projects announced by the authorities. There 
seemed to be no automatic, blanket endorsement of central planning 
from their part. More, some of them turned campaigners, albeit retaining 
their identity as professionals and their commitment to their practice, 
and mobilized, as experts, against the municipality’s plans. Campaigners’ 
precise critique, based on the technical inadequacy of plans, was not 
solely a mark of their professional background but also a strategic move: 
once the claim of scientific legitimacy was demolished, this would expose 
the underlying political and economic interests that it concealed. This 
was hoped to protect residents’ welfare in the end. Belief in technical 
expertise did not necessarily mean alignment with elite power. In this 
sense, campaigners reported few of the “pious illusions” Rodwin (1981). 
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Curiously, these observations are more readily acknowledged in critical 
architectural studies than in anthropology.
More poignantly, these considerations imply that expertise and plan-
ning may themselves live in opposition to official urbanism. No archi-
tect I came across in Beirut would be troubled by the observation that, 
in principle, planning might be lacking and technical expertise might 
be outdated or bring about ruinous consequences for inhabitants. In the 
case of the Hakmeh Axis, this was precisely why my interlocutors mobi-
lized. Those who did reject this possibility were seen as inherently unpro-
fessional and politically driven, whether because of personal necessity, 
political opportunism, or genuine ideological alignment. The point here 
is not to demonize professionals who work for central authorities, either, 
as the analytical worth of positing a sharp dichotomy based on value is 
dubious. Rather, the aim of this analysis is to establish that experts of the 
city have their own politics, no more and no less than anyone else, and 
that this cannot be established a priori.
While it is true that in a wealth of cases experts do indeed act as 
organic intellectuals, whether eagerly or begrudgingly, this does not 
mean that this alliance is natural—or necessary. If the anthropology of 
planning has usually found a direct correlation between expertise and 
the political effects of planning, recognizing the non-necessary nature 
of this relationship forces us to reconsider and ultimately complicate our 
understanding of that relationship. Campaigners in Beirut positioned 
themselves squarely within the realm of the citizenry, rather than with 
municipal power. Conscious of the existing political cleavage, they 
chose to align themselves with what they perceived to be the interests 
of the city dwellers and not those of developers and politicians. Unlike 
the experts described in other works on urbanism (Lefebvre 1996; De 
Certeau 1984), architects in Beirut did not solely desire a God-like view 
over the city. The argument might be made that an important factor 
behind this positioning is that professionals are citizens as well as experts. 
In the case of professionals-turned-campaigners, actors readily recognize 
this fact without any contradiction. In fact, this double self-identification 
forms the cornerstone of their mobilization, which aims to operate with 
the citizenry in mind, and not politicians and real estate developers.
The point here is also not to idealize the figure of the city profes-
sional. Of course, civic movements in Beirut were never an exclusive 
prerogative of experts; rather, the latter often gained the collaboration 
of local residents and neighborhood associations, as well as volunteers 
and sympathizers from different social groups and political camps. In the 
case of the Hakmeh Axis highway, for instance, the campaign was felt by 
local residents, so much so that a number of them got actively involved.
Moreover, architects, engineers, and other similar professionals 
are, overall, usually in a more privileged position than most in society, 
including those affected by the plans they draft—whether these plans are 
drafted for central authorities, private companies, or civic campaigning. 
Their counter-plans might—wittingly or unwittingly—favor the urban 
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vision of a particular section of “the public,” whose socioeconomic back-
ground and outlook is similar to their own. Yet professionals of the city 
can become powerful advocates for new kinds of urban management, 
actively proposing new plans, and forming coalitions with different local 
and transnational actors according to a diversity of principles, strategies, 
and projects. Instead of writing them off in a facile way, I propose we 
investigate them in this context, and ask questions about their mobi-
lization. What kind of projects do they propose, and who participates 
in their drafting? Who is involved, and who is excluded? What are the 
strengths and shortcoming of such mobilizations, and what are their pos-
sibilities and potential outcomes? Can they be sustained in time, and 
at what cost? And lastly, what kind of notion of “public good” do they 
support, and is it shared by broader sections of the citizenry?
Gledhill (2013) rightly reminds us that even if more architects and 
engineers are joining forces with residents and community campaigners, 
state planning has not significantly changed. Yet focusing on plan-
ners-as-campaigners and answering these questions might enhance our 
understanding of emergent notions of civic engagement and participa-
tion and political marginalization, as well as the multiple political proj-
ects that are being developed by different actors: not only central 
authorities, but different groups of urban dwellers equipped with differ-
ent visions and varying degrees of influence on the decision-making pro-
cess. It seems reasonable to suggest that in a rapidly changing global 
environment, and at a time when even widely accepted models of collab-
orative urban planning bend under the pressure of political and eco-
nomic power dynamics (Tooley 2017), it is imperative that the critical 
social sciences examine all emergent initiatives attempting to reconfig-
ure established modes of urban management and urban politics itself, 
ethnographically and wherever they might manifest.
Notes
1Throughout the article, these professional figures—architects, 
urban planners, engineers—will be referred to collectively as “plan-
ning experts,” “planning professionals,” “experts of the city,” or simply 
“experts.”
2In his important work on state planning, Scott (1998, 4) is care-
ful to distinguish between legitimate scientific practice and ideological, 
uncritical faith in technical skills and scientific progress, which he calls 
“high-modernism.” Despite this distinction, anthropological writing on 
urban planning has arguably focused on planners as high-modernists.
3Other noteworthy examples, which I leave out due to space con-
straints, are Baxstrom (2013), Boholm (2013), Murdoch and Abram 
(2002), and Yarrow (2019).
4The Arabic term refers to both the two categories that in English 
would be distinguished as “engineers” and “architects.” Verdeil (2007) 
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observes that in Lebanon there is also little distinction between muhande-
sun and urban planners, and that in practice, professionals in the field 
routinely work in both capacities over the course of their career.
5The floor-area ratio indicates the relationship between the total 
floor area of all floors of a building and the size of the land on which the 
building stands. If comparing two buildings standing on areas of the same 
size, a higher FAR will usually indicate a taller building with a greater 
number of floors, hence the possibility of more living units and thus resi-
dents. Consequently, higher FARs allow developers to exploit land more, 
potentially making more profit, but also create a very densely populated 
and built urban environment.
6Academics in fields like architecture, engineering, or landscape 
design are often active practitioners as well as scholars, or have practiced 
in the past, so the two designations often intertwine.
7It should be noted in this regard that some of the most critical 
works on the problematic relationship between politics and urbanism 
in Lebanon are written by architects—for instance Fawaz (2016) Sarkis 
and Rowe (1998).
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